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1957] RECENT DECISIONS
United States,26 and in today's expanded and complex business world,
it retains its importance.2 7 The decision in the instant case would
appear to place the Supreme Court in accord with this view.
Despite the possibility, pointed out by the dissent,28 of an in-
creased number of stockholder suits burdening the federal courts, s2
the Supreme Court is strengthening the guarantee of an impartial
forum wherein stockholder suits may be used to enforce corporate
responsibility ". . . without destroying the right of a majority of
the members of a corporate body to govern the affairs of that body." 30
X
INTERNATIONAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - TREATIES -
ExERcISE OF WAIVER PROVISION IN JAPANESE PROTOCOL HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL.-On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
other relief, the District Court for the District of Columbia ' enjoined
the United States authorities from delivering an American soldier to
the Japanese Government for trial in the killing of a Japanese citizen.
21 See Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It,
18 A.B.A.J. 433, 437 (1932). Judge Parker says of diversity jurisdiction:
"No power exercised under the Constitution has . . . had greater influence
in welding these United States into a single nation; nothing has done more to
foster interstate commerce and communication and uninterrupted flow of
capital for investment into the various parts of the Union; and nothing has
been so potent in sustaining the public credit and the sanctity of private
contracts." Ibid.
27 See JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DREcTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 81
(1955).
23 The dissent declares: "Refusal to sue provides automatic entry." Smith
v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 105 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
29 See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). For a statistical survey of the
amount of diversity of citizenship litigation in the federal courts, see JUDicrAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 94 (1955).30 Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Sudt: Notes on Its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 980, 993 (1957).
' Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1957). The respondent
Girard, while guarding a machine gun during a small unit exercise at Camp
Weir range area in Japan, had shot and killed a Japanese woman who was
gathering expended cartridge cases in the area. The United States claimed the
right to try Girard upon the ground that his act, as certified by his command-
ing officer, was "done in the performance of official duty'." Japan contended
that his act was not in the line of duty and that therefore Japan had the
right to try him. The matter was considered by a Joint Committee which was
unable to agree. Thereafter, the United States authorities notified Japan that
Girard would be turned over to them for trial. It was at this point that Girard
petitioned the district court.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court reversed that portion of the decision granting the
injunction and held, per curiam, that there was no constitutional or
statutory barrier to the performance of a Protocol, made pursuant to
an administrative agreement authorized by treaty, 2 for waiver by the
United States of qualified jurisdiction granted it by Japan over
offenses committed in Japan by members of the United States armed
forces. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
The constitutionality of one of the most controversial 3 articles of
the Japanese Protocol 4 has thus been unsuccessfully challenged.
Although treaties are the supreme law of the land 5 and a treaty has
never been held unconstitutional,6 it seems that where a treaty is di-
rectly contrary to the Constitution the treaty must yield.7 The
Protocol in question did not have specific legislative sanction but the
administrative agreement 8 was authorized by the Security Treaty
with Japan 9 and was before the Senate when it ratified the treaty.' 0
The respondent Girard claimed, in the lower court, that exercise
of the waiver provision would deprive him of fundamental constitu-
tional rights. 1 The Supreme Court avoided the question of loss of
2 Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under
Article III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America and
Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S. TREATiEs & OTmER INT'L AGREEMENTS 1846,
T.I.A.S. No. 2848 (hereinafter cited as Protocol).
S For a detailed discussion on the application of the Status of Forces
Agreement, see Hearings on H.i. Res. 309 and Sinilar Measures Before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as HOUSE Commi=E HEARiNGs).
4 Protocol art. XVII, para. 3, deals with criminal offenses in violation of
the laws of both nations and provides, in part, that the United States shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction in relation to offenses arising
out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty and that
the state having the primary right may waive its right on request from the
other state. There is a similar provision in art. VII, para. 3, of the Agree-
ment Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status
of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S. TRE'rIEs & OTm INT'L AG.E~mrsTs
1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (hereinafter cited as NATO Status of Forces
Agreement).5 U.S. CoxsT. art. VI, cI. 2.
6 SVARLIEN, Air INTRODUCTON TO THE LAW OF NATioNS 266 (1955).
7 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (dictum) ; United States v. Min-
nesota. 270 U.S. 181, 207-08 (1926) (dictum). But cf. Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
8 3 U.S. TREATrsS & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492.
9 3 U.S. TREATxrs & OTHER INT'L AGREEMENTS 3329; T.T.A.S. No. 2491.
10 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1957). An executive agreement
inconsistent with a prior Act of Congress has been declared void [United
States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955)], while a treaty prevails over a prior inconsistent
federal statute. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (dictum).
Therefore, the Court in the instant case, by limiting its discussion to whether
the agreement was prohibited by subsequent legislation (Wilson v. Girard,
supra at 530) seems to have implied that the indirect authorization by the
Senate raised the agreement above the level of an ordinary executive agreement.
11 Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 22 (D.D.C. 1957). For a considera-
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individual rights under the Protocol by saying, in effect, that the Con-
stitution does not prevent the United States from waiving qualified
jurisdiction granted it by Japan.
Japan, as a sovereign nation, has exclusive jurisdiction to punish
crimes committed within its borders unless it either expressly or im-
pliedly relinquishes this jurisdiction.' 2  In the absence of such relin-
quishment, ordinary citizens traveling in a foreign country are not
immune from the criminal jurisdiction and laws of that country.'3
However, some authorities claim that, under international law, a spe-
cial immunity attaches by implication to military forces when in a
friendly foreign country.14
These claims are usually based on the opinion in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon.'5 By way of dicta the Court in that case
stated that friendly foreign troops in passage through a country en-
joyed an exemption from the criminal jurisdiction of that country.16
This view was later expanded by other dicta in a subsequent case to
include immunity for a friendly occupying force.' 7
In any case, this principle applies only when the nation receiving
the military forces has not expressly stated its attitude on criminal
jurisdiction. The Protocol expresses Japan's attitude. It gives con-
current jurisdiction and the primary right to exercise this jurisdiction
to the United States in cases where the act in question was done dur-
ing the performance of official duty.18 Since the clause permitting
tion of the constitutional rights to which an accused might be entitled were he
subject to United States jurisdiction, see HousE Commrr= HEARINGS 250-56.
12 "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
.. All exceptions ... must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself....
This consent may be either express or implied." The Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (dictum). See also
2 HACKSWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERxATiNAL LAW 1 (1941).
13 Ibid.
14 See, e.g., King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces, 36 Am.
J. INT. L. 539 (1942). See also HousE Comirraz HEARINGS 3.
I 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The direct holding of this case was
that a friendly foreign warship was immune from attachment by one claiming
to be its owner.
16The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 139-40
(1812).
27 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879). See also Coleman v. Ten-
nessee, 97 U.S. 509, 516 (1878) (dictum). The main issue in both these cases
concerned hostile occupying forces. For a discussion of the misapplication of
the principles of the Schooner Exchange case by authorities and a general
treatment of the international law relevant to jurisdictional problems both
before and after the Status of Forces Agreements, see Re, The NATO Status
of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 349 (1955).
See also Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Armed Forces Abroad,
70 HARv. L. REv. 1043 (1957).18 Protocol art. XVII, para. 3(a).
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waiver of primary jurisdiction is an integral part of the Protocol, 19 it
must be looked upon as a possible limitation on the right of a soldier
acting in the line of duty to be tried under United States laws.
In view of the fact that a sovereign nation may validly retain
jurisdiction over any act of a foreigner done within that nation, a
more basic question, which was not raised by respondent and which
the Court did not discuss, is whether the federal government has the
power to conscript men during times of peace and send them into a
country which does not recognize the constitutional rights of an
American citizen. It would seem that the government has this
power.2 0 At a time when United States foreign policy requires that
troops be stationed in a great many foreign countries, 21 the Supreme
Court in the instant case has thus held that the wisdom of any arrange-
ment (such as the Japanese Protocol) ". . . is exclusively for the
determination of the Executive and Legislative Branches." 22
It is improbable that the United States could obtain exclusive
jurisdiction over all acts of the military in Japan and other countries
by treaty. 23 It is therefore the policy of the United States to request
a waiver in every case in which a NATO country has primary juris-
diction.2 4  In the event that such request is denied and an American
soldier is subjected to trial, American authorities ought to make
every effort to insure that substantial justice is obtained.25
19 1d. at para. 3(c).
20The right of the government to exercise this power in times of peace is
well settled. See Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918); Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). These cases do not expressly limit this power
to time of war but the war powers of Congress upon which they are based
would seem to extend into a time of peace only to cope with a condition of
which war was a direct and immediate cause. Cf. Woods v. Miller, 333 U.S.
138 (1948). Whether the United States is at present in a state of "cold war,"
neither a time of war nor of peace [see ORFziD & RE, INTERNATONAL LAW
617-19 (1955)] which would extend the war powers of Congress still further
does not seem to have been determined. It has been suggested that ". . . it
might well be that Congress should be the only branch of government
authorized . . . [to declare that such a state existed]." Jessup, Should Inter-
national Law Recognize an International Status Between Peace and War?,
48 Am. J. INT. L. 98, 102 (1954).
21 See letter from Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, to Rep. T. S.
Gordon, July 1, 1957, as reported in Status of Forces Agreements, Dep't of
Defense News Release No. 683-57, para. IV, July 2, 1957.
22 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957).
23 See Wilson letter supra note 21, at para. II.
24 See Note, 70 HtAuv. L. REV. 1043, 1061 (1957).
25 The NATO Status of Forces Agreement art. VII, para. 9, states:
"Whenever a member of a force . . . is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of
a receiving State he shall be entitled-(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;(b) to be informed in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges
made against him; (c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if they
are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State; (e) to have legal repre-
sentation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or assisted legal
representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the re-
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